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THE DOCTRINE OF ECLIPSE IN CONSTITUTIONAL
LAw: A CuncAL REAPPRAISAL OF ITS
CONTEMPORARY SCOPE AND RELEVANCE
Sushila Rao*
This paper delineates the evolution of the Doctrine of Eclipse through
judicialpronouncements by exploring its fundamental premises, and
then delves into the contentious issue of extending its applicability
to post-Constitutional laws. Eminent jurists posit themselves on
opposing extremes of the academic spectrum on this point, and
contradictoryjudicial pronouncements add to the confusion. The
author submits that much of this debate has centered around
whether any distinction can be made between laws void for lack of
legislative competence and those void for violating constitutional
limitations on legislative power, and whether the word "void" in
Article 13(2) is to be accordeda meaning different from the meaning
attached to it in Article 13(1); and seeks to explore these
controversies in an attempt to clarify the current legal position.
Finally, the author seeks to highlight one of the most crucial, yet, in
India, often ignoredfeatures of the Doctrine, namely, its relevance
as a tool for resolution of Centre-State disputes under Articles 251
and 254, and to reflect on whether it has outlived its utility.
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I. INTRODUCTION
"Judicial Review" is defined as the interposition of judicial restraint on the
legislative and executive organs of the Government.' It is the "overseeing by the
judiciary of the exercise of powers by other co-ordinate organs of government
with a view to ensuring that they remain confined to the limits drawn upon their
powers by the Constitution."2 The concept has its origins in the theory of limited
Government and the theory of two laws - the ordinary and the Supreme (i.e., the
Constitution) - which entails that any act of the ordinary law-making bodies that
contravenes the provisions of the Supreme Law must be void, and there must be
some organ possessing the power or authority to pronounce such legislative acts
void.3
With the adoption of a written Constitution and the incorporation of Part
III conferring Fundamental Rights therein, it was inevitable that the validity of all
H.K SAmmRAy, THE CONsTrUION OF INDIA: AN ANALYTICAL APPROACH
2 S.P. SATHE, JUDCIAL ACTIVIsM IN INDIA 1 (2002).
3

57

(2001).

See M.P. JAIN, INDIAN CoNsrn-TIoNAL LAw 1822-23 (2003) [hereinafter Jain]. See generally
the historic case of Marbury v. Madison, 2 US L. Ed. 6o (1803), which established this
doctrine in the United States. Constitutional supremacy is an accepted canon of
Constitutional law, and is enshrined in Constitutions the world over. For instance,
Article 98 of the Japanese Constitution provides:
This Constitution shall be the Supreme Law of the State, and no public law
or ordinance or Imperial transcript or other act of Government, or part
thereof, contrary to the provisions hereof, shall have legal force or validity.
available at http://www.solonorg/Constitutions/Japan/English/
english-Constitution.html (last visited March 18, 2006).

CONLrION or JAPAN,
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laws in India would be tested on the touchstone of the Constitution. Nevertheless,
the Constitution-makers included an explicit guarantee of the justiciability of
fundamental rights in Article 13, which has been invoked on numerous occasions
for declaring laws contravening them void. Courts have evolved various doctrines
like the doctrines of severability, prospective overruling, and acquiescence, for
the purposes of effecuating this Article.? The Doctrine of Eclipse ("the Doctrine")
is one such principle, based on the premise that fundamental rights are prospective
in nature. As a result of its operation, "an existing law inconsistent with a
fundamental right, though it becomes inoperative from the date of commencement
of the Constitution, is not dead altogether."6 Hence, in essence, the Doctrine seeks
to address the following quandary: If a law is declared null and void for infringing
on a fundamental right, and then that fundamental right is itself amended such
that the law is purged of any inconsistency with it, does the law necessarily have
to be re-enacted afresh, or can it revive automatically from the date of the
amendment? In other words, what is the precise nature of the operation of the
Doctrine in the face of the general rule that a Statute void for unconstitutionality
is non-est and "notionally obliterated" from the Statute Book?7 Inherent in the
application of the Doctrine to such questions is the predicament of conflicting
priorities. What is to be determined here is whether, for the purpose of avoiding
the administrative difficulties and expenditure involved in re-enacting a law, a
law which was held void on the very sensitive and potent ground of violation of
fundamental rights should, under special circumstances be permitted to revive
automatically. This also raises some profound questions about legislative
competence and the interference of courts in law making. These are the issues
that this paper seeks to address. In doing so, the first part of this paper definitively
traces the origin and fruition of the Doctrine through judicial pronouncements,

Article 13 reads:
13. Laws inconsistent with or in derogation of the fundamental rights.
(i) All laws in force in the territory of Indian immediately before the
commencement of this Constitution, in so far as they are inconsistent
with the provisions of this Part, shall, to the extent of such inconsistency,
be void.
(2) The State shall not make any law which takes away or abridges the
rights conferred by this Part and any law made in contravention of this
clause shall, to the extent of the contravention, be void.
5 V.N. SaunA's THE CONsrrTION OF INDUA 29-32 (M.P. Singh ed., 2001).
6 P. RAMANATHAiYnn's THE LAw LExiCON 585 (Justice Y.V. Chandrachud et al. eds., 2002).
CoNsTrurozN OF INDIA, 1950,

7

See the Supreme Court's discussion of the doctrine in Bhikaji Narain Dhakras v.
State of Madhya Pradesh, A.LR. 1955 S.C. 781.
See Venkataraman, The Status of an UnconstitutionalStatute, 2 J. IND. L. INsT 401
(1960).
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by exploring its fundamental premises. The second part delves into the litigious
issue of extending its applicability to post-Constitutional laws,
An extremely vital aspect of the Doctrine - which, in India, has thus far
been largely overlooked by legal theorists and practitioners alike - is its crucial
role in the federalframework. A survey of the principal federations in the AngloAmerican world shows that the Doctrine has been used primarily in cases where
the enacting legislature undoubtedly had the power to enact a law, but the law
was rendered inoperative because of supervening impossibilities, arising in the
form of other incompatible laws enacted by legislatures having superior powers
to enact such laws. A complete demarcation of powers between the federal and
state spheres is neither feasible nor desirable in a federal polity. Necessarily,
therefore, there must be provision for a sphere wherein concurrent powers are
exercised by the federal and the state legislatures. It is in this area, that occasions
for the use of the Doctrine have arisen. Since both legislatures undoubtedly have
the competence to enact laws, in case both of them choose to exercise their powers,
intriguing constitutional questions arise as to the status of the "lesser" State law.
Is it rendered null and void, or does the possibility of its prospective revival
subsist? Here, the Doctrine serves as a convenient mechanism for resolving
potential Centre-State disputes, in the event of repugnancy between Central and
State Acts. Drawing upon the analysis of the working of the Doctrine in the area of
fundamental rights violations, this absorbing facet will also be examined in detail
by the author in the final part of this paper.

11. TRACING

THE GENESIS AND EvoLUTION OF THE
DOCTRINE

A. The Decision in Keshavan
In India, the Doctrine of Eclipse has been referred to, most frequently, in
cases involving alleged violations of fundamental rights. Questions regarding the
retrospectivity of these rights and the import of the word "void" in Article 13(1)
of the Constitution, came up for deliberation in the leading case of Keshavan
Madhava Menon v. State of Bombay," wherein a prosecution proceeding was
initiated against the appellant under the Indian Press (Emergency Powers) Act,
1931, in respect of a pamphlet published in 1949. The present Constitution came
into force during the pendency of the proceedings. The appellant pleaded that the
impugned section of the 1931 Act was in contravention of Article 19(i)(a) of the

* A.I.R. 1951 S.C.

128.
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Constitution, and by virtue of Article 13(1), was void. Hence, it was argued that
the proceedings against him could not be continued. This case raised several
challenging issues with respect to the Doctrine, as analysed below.

(i)

The Retrospectivity of Fundamental Rights

It is now well settled that the Constitution has no retrospective effect.9
However, one of the basic questions related to the origin of the Doctrine of Eclipse
that was raised in Keshavan, was whether fundamental rights are retrospective in
operation. Article 13(1) provides that all pre-Constitutional laws, in so far as they
are inconsistent with fundamental rights, are void. If fundamental rights are
retrospective, then all pre-Constitutional laws inconsistent with fundamental
rights must be void ab initio.
On this point, in Keshavan, both Das and Mahajan, JJ., maintained that
fundamental rights, including the freedom of speech and expression, were granted
for the first time by the Constitution and that in September 1949, when proceedings
were initiated, the appellant did not enjoy these rights.o Hence, it was established
that, as fundamental rights became operative only on, and from the date of the
Constitution coming into force, the question of inconsistency of the existing laws
with those rights must necessarily arise only on and from such date.

(ii) The Prospective Nature of Article 13(1)
Turning specifically to Article 13(1), the Court further held that every statute
is primafade prospective unless it is expressly or by necessary implication made
retrospective. According to him, there was nothing in the language of Article
13(1), to suggest that there was an intention to give it retrospective operation. In
fact, the Court was of the opinion that the language clearly points the other way.
It was therefore held that Article 13(1) can have no retrospective effect, but is
wholly prospective in operation." This interpretation has been upheld in
subsequent cases. i

9 State of Bombay v. F.N. Balsara, A.IR. 1951.S.C. 318; Syed Qasim Razvi v. State of
Hyderabad, A.I.R. 1953 S.C. 156.

10Keshavan, supra note 8, at
i

130.

Keshavan, supra note 8, at 130.
See, e.g., Purshottam Govindji Halai v. B.M. Desal, A.I.R. 1956 S.C. 20; Pannalal
Binjraj v. Union of India, A.LR. 1957 S.C. 397.
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(iii) Meaning and implication of "void" in Article 13(1)
In the Supreme Court, the majority, while maintaining that the proceedings
under the impugned law could not be quashed, rejected the High Court's view that
the meaning of the word "void" in Article 13(l) amounts to "repeal" of the statute.
It was held that the effect of Article 13 is quite different from the effect of the
expiry of a temporary statute or its repeal by a subsequent statute. Article 13(1)
only has the effect of nullifying or rendering all inconsistent existing laws ineffectual
or nugatory and devoid of any legal binding force or effect, with respect to the
exercise of fundamental rights, on and after the date of the Constitution's
commencement. According to Das J.:
Article 13(1) cannot be read as obliterating the entire operation of
the inconsistent laws, or to wipe them out altogether from the statute
book, for to do so will be to give them retrospective effect which, we
have said, they do not possess. Such laws exist for all past transactions

and for enforcing all rights and liabilities accrued before the date of
the Constitution.s [emphasis added.]

B. Post-Keshavan: Evolution of the Doctrine through Case
Law
One of the earliest cases that dealt with the nexus between Article 13(1) and
validation of pre-Constitutional laws infringing on fundamental rights was Behram
Khurshid Pesikaka v. State of Bombay.'
In this case, the appellant was charged under Section 66(b), Bombay
Prohibition Act, 1949 for driving under the influence of alcohol. However, in an
earlier case, State of Bombay v. F.N. Balsara, section 13(b), Bombay Prohibition
Act, 1949, was declared to be void so far as it affected the consumption or use of
medicinal and toilet preparations containing alcohol, as it was violative of Article
19(1)(f). It was contended by the appellant in Behram, that since in Balsara the
prohibition on possession and consumption of medicinal and toilet preparations
containing alcohol was held to be invalid, therefore, section 66(b) was inoperative
and unenforceable so far as such items were concerned. Therefore, the question
to be considered in Behrarn, was the effect of the declaration in Balsara on the

Keshavan, supra note 8, 130,
14A.IR. 1955 S.C. 123.
13

1s A.IR. 1951 S.C. 318.
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Bombay Prohibition Act, 1949. At the initial stage, the Supreme Court judges
unanimously agreed that a declaration by a court that part of a section was invalid,
did not repeal or amend that section, or add a proviso or exception to it, since
repeal or amendment was a legislative function. 6 This compelling constitutional
question was, however, referred to a larger Bench, where Mahajan, C.J., held that
the part of the section of an existing law which is unconstitutional is not law, and
is null and void. It is notionally obliteratedfrom the Statute book for the purposes
of determining the rights and obligations of citizens. However, the same remains
good law when a question arises for determination of rights and obligations
incurred before 26 January, 195o.7 Das, J. dissented and was of the opinion that
the effect of Balsara was that the prohibition contained in the relevant part of
Section 13(b) would be ineffective against, and inapplicable to, a citizen who
consumes or uses medicinal and toilet preparations containing alcohol. However,
he was opposed to Mahajan, C.J.'s idea that, this part of the section can be taken to
be notionally obliterated from the Statute book. The very basis of the Balsara
declaration, according to him, was that a citizen has the fundamental right to
possess or consume medicinal and toilet preparations containing alcohol. Hence,
the onus is on the accused to prove that the section which has been declared void
should not be applicable to him. If the accused is able to prove that he is a citizen,
the Balsara decision will ensure that he is not punished.
Authors like Seervai, have severely criticized the reasoning followed by
Mahajan, C.J., because of his use of the term "notionally obliterated." According
to Seervai, if the view of the Court in Keshavan that the term "void" does not
mean "repealed", and that Article 13 cannot be read as obliterating the entire
operation of inconsistent laws, is taken to be correct, then there is no scope for an
unconstitutional provision to be "notionally obliterated."8 Thus, according to
Seervai, the dissenting judgment of Das, J. is the correct statement of the law.

C. The Propounding of the Doctrine
The prospective nature of Article 13(1), and the limited connotation
accorded to the word "void" in Keshavan, which was expounded by Das, J. in
Behram, necessitated the enunciation of the Doctrine of Eclipse in the leading
case of Bhikaji Narain Dhakras v. State of Madhya Pradesh.9 In this case, the
t6

Behrani, supra note 14. See generally H.M. SEERVAM, CONSTUIONAL LAW OF INDIA 411 (1993)

[hereinafter SEERVAI].
Behram, supra note 14, at 145.
is Seervai, supra note 16, at 412.
19 A.I.R. 1955, S.C. 781. See JAIN, supra note 3, at 992 (2003).
'7
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impugned provision allowed for the creation of a Government monopoly in the
private transport business. After the coming into force of the Constitution, this
provision became void for violating Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution. However,
Article 19(6) was amended in 1951, so as to permit State monopoly in business.20
It was argued on behalf of the petitioners that the impugned Act, being void
under Article 13(1), was dead and could not be revived by any subsequent
amendment of the Constitution, but had to be re-enacted, This contention was
rejected by a unanimous decision of the Supreme Court, which laid down that
after the amendment of Article 19(6) in 1951, the constitutional impediment was
removed. The Act, therefore, ceased to be unconstitutional, and became revivified
and enforceable.?
The crux of the decision was the observation that an existing law
inconsistent with a fundamental right, though inoperative from the date of
commencement of the Constitution, is not dead altogether. According to some

authors, it "is a good law if a question arises for determination of rights and
obligations incurred before the commencement of the Constitution, and also for
the determination of rights of persons who have not been given fundamental
rights by the Constitution."- In this context, Das, C.J., held:
The true position is that the impugned law became, as it were, eclipsed,
for the time being, by the fundamental right. The effect of the
Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951 was to remove the shadow
and to make the impugned Act free from all blemish or infirmity.23
He reiterated that such laws remained in force qua non-citizens, and it was
only against the citizens that they remained in a dormant or moribund condition.
This case was thus the foundation of the Doctrine, which has since been the subject
of judicial contemplation in numerous decisions.

- Bhikaji Narain Dhakras, id. at 782.
2 Bhikaji NarainDhakras, supra note 19, at 784. See also Dr. Pam Rajput, Articles 14 to
18, in CoNs'rMrruoNA LAw or INaA 213 (M. Hidayatullah ed., 1986).
22 SHUKLA, supra note 5, at 31. According to Seervai, this judgment
in substance overrules
the judgment of Mahajan, C.J., in Behram, A.IR. 1951 S.C. 123. See SEERVAI, supra

note 16, at 413.
23

Bhikaji, A.LR. 1955 S.C. 781, 784-85.
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III.

THE UTILITY OF THE DOCTRINE OF ECLIPSE IN THE

REALM OF POST-CONSTITUTIONAL LAws
A. Can the Doctrine be Applied to Post-Constitutional
Laws?
In the author's opinion, three questions must be answered, in order to
gauge the applicability of the Doctrine to post-Constitutional laws. First, can a
post-Constitutional law be revived by a subsequent Constitutional amendment
removing the Constitutional bar to its enforceability? Second, if a postConstitutional law violates rights conferred on citizens alone, (and thus becomes

void qua them), does it remain valid and operative qua non-citizens like foreigners
and companies? Finally, can amending the Act in question so as to remove the
blemish revive the law in question, or will it have to be re-enacted as a whole? This
Part will examine each of these questions in detail.
In SaghirAhmed v. State of U.P.,24 a Constitution Bench of the Apex Court
applied to the impugned postunanimously stated that the Doctrine could not
Constitutional law. A legislation that contravened Article 19(1)(g) and was not
protected by clause (6) of the Article, when it was enacted after the commencement

of the Constitution, could not be validated even by subsequent Constitutional
am endment.25
However, the following observation of Das, C.J. in Bhikaji, has generated
much perplexity on the issue:
But apart from this distinction between pre-Constitution and postConstitution laws on which, however, we need not rest our decision,

it must be held that these American authorities can have no
application to our Constitution. All laws, existing or future, which
are inconsistent with the provisions of Part III of our Constitution
are, by the express provision of Article 13, rendered void 'to the
extent of such inconsistency.' Such laws were not dead for all

24

A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 728.

this context, Prof. Cooley has famously observed:
A statute void for unconstitutionality is dead and cannot be vitalised by a
subsequent amendment of the Constitution removing the constitutional
objection but must be re-enacted.
See CoouEY, ATREATSE ON THE CONSTITTONAL LIArTiONs WHICH REs UPON ITELEGIS.TrvE PoWER
OF THE STATES 201 (1927). This contention was accepted in this case as sound.

25In
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purposes. They existed for the purpose of pre-Constitution rights
and liabilities and they remained operative, even after the
Constitution, as against non citizens.2 6

The "American authorities" referred to in this case by the Supreme Court
involved only post- Constitutional laws which were inconsistent with the
provisions of the American Constitution, and which were held to be "still born",
as it were. Thus, these American rulings clearly could not apply to the case of preConstitutional laws that were perfectly valid before the Constitution's provisions
took effect. Nevertheless, this observation has been used to contend that the
Court has not drawn any distinction between pre- and post-Constitutional laws.
The author submits, however, that in the latter part of the observation, the Court
had in mind only the pre-Constitutional laws, otherwise it could not have stated
that the laws existed for the purpose of pre-Constitutional rights and liabilities
and that they remained operative even after the Constitution as against noncitizens.
In Deep Chand v. State of U.P.25 it was held that there is a clear distinction
between the two clauses of Article 13. Under clause (1) a pre-Constitutional law
subsists except to the extent of its inconsistency with the provisions of Part III,
whereas as per clause (2), no post-Constitutional law can be made contravening
the provisions of Part III and therefore the law to that extent, though made, is a
nullity from its inception.
Mahendra Lal Jaini v. State of U.P- is the most authoritative decision for
the impossibility of reviving post-Constitutional laws by a Constitutional
amendment. The Court based its finding on the two grounds. First, the language
and scope of Article 13(1) and 13(2) are different. Clause (1) dearly recognizes the
existence of pre-Constitutional laws which were valid when enacted, and therefore
could be revived by the Doctrine. Clause (2) on the other hand begins with an
injunction to the State not to make a law which takes away or abridges the rights
conferred by Part III. The legislative power of Parliament and State Legislatures
under Article 245 is subject to the other provisions of the Constitution and
therefore, subject to Article 13(2). Second, "contravention" takes place only once
the law is made. This is because the contravention is of the prohibition to make

26

2
zS

Bhikaji, A.ILR. 1955 S.C. 781, 783.
SERvAi, supra note 16, at 413.
A.I.R. 1959 S.C. 648.

- A.1.R. 1963 S.C. 1019.
30 Id. at 1029.
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any law, which takes away or abridges the fundamental rights. It is no argument
to say that simply because the Amendment removes any subsequent scope for
contravention, the law is no longer in conflict with the Constitution.
However, the scope of the principles established above stands drastically
curtailed in view of the Supreme Court decision in State of Gujaratv. Shree Ambica
Mills,3' wherein Matthew, J. held that like a pre-Constitutional law, a postConstitutional law contravening a fundamental right could also be valid in relation
to those, whose rights were not infringed upon. For instance, when a postConstitutional law violates a fundamental right like Article 19 which is granted to
citizens alone, it would remain valid in relation to non-citizens?' Thus the term
"void" in both the clauses of Article 13 makes a law only relatively void, and not
absolutely void.
This judgment has been used to contend that the Doctrine has finally been
extended to all post-Constitutional laws as well, since it recognizes that the law is
not an absolute nullity and can operate against non-citizens.3 The author submits
that this is not the correct proposition of law. It is evident that a law which abridges
the rights of only citizens will remain enforceable against non-citizens, and thus,
there is no question of the Doctrine of Eclipse even entering the picture. However,
as regards citizens whose rights were infringed, the law must he regarded as stillborn and void ab initio, and therefore, in order to make it apply to citizens, the
law would have to re-enacted afresh.
From this arises the final question: When a post-Constitutional law is held
inconsistent with a fundamental right, can it be revived by amending the Act in
question so as to remove the blemish, or will it have to be re-enacted as a whole?
The Delhi High Court in P.L. Mehra v. D.R. Khanna,34 has held that the legislation
will have to be re-enacted and that it cannot be revived by mere amendment. This
view appears to the author to emanate logically from the position adopted by the
Supreme Court in treating such a law as void ab initio. There is,.therefore, no need
to apply the Doctrine of Eclipse to post-Constitutional laws, as discussed above.
There is no direct Supreme Court ruling on this point. The closest authority on
3
this issue is Shama Rao v. State of Maharashtra,
wherein an Act was challenged
on the ground of excessive delegation, and pending the decision, the Legislature

3

A.I.R. 1974 S.C. 1300.

32

Id.

at 1309-11.

See generally V.S.

DESHiPANDE, Jumn.

REVIEW OF LEGISLATION

SA.LR. 1971 Del. i.
SA.I.R.

1967 S.C. 480.
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passed an Amendment Act seeking to remove the defect. The Supreme Court
ruled by a majority that when an Act suffers from excessive delegation, it is stillborn and void ab initio. It cannot be revived by an amending Act seeking to
remove the vice, and must be re-enacted as a whole. It is submitted that this
ruling supports the proposition that an Act held invalid under Article 13(2) would
not be revived merely by amending it, but would have to be re-enacted. Hence,
we may safely infer that Ambica Mills does not destroy the force of the judicial
pronouncements in Deep Chand and Mahendra Jaini,but merely limits the scope
of their operation, and that the Doctrine, as of now, cannot be extended to pos t Constitutional laws.

B. The Repercussions, ifany, ofthe "Degree"of
Unlawfulness of the Impugned Legislation
It must be noted that underlying the Doctrine of Eclipse is the fundamental
distinction mandated by the rule of law, i.e., the distinction between the lawful
and the unlawful. Given that the ultra vires doctrine is the "central principle of
administrative law",36 the obvious way in which the distinction between lawful
and unlawful is expressed, is through the proposition that a decision-maker who
decides unlawfully, does an act which he has no power to do; this act is therefore,
in law, no act at all. It is invalid or simply void, and hence incapable of being
revived posthumously, so to speak.
However, at this juncture, we might also take note of a particular strand of
opinion being voiced in England, according to which it is "apparently equally
clear that an unlawful decision is often effective until set aside by a court of
competent authority. And, if that unlawful decision is not successfully challenged,
it will turn out to be as good as the most proper decision."7 As Lord Radcliffe put
it, in the leading case of Smith v. East Elloe Rural District Council,8 unless "the
necessary proceedings are taken at law to establish the cause of invalidity [an
unlawful act] will remain as effective for its ostensible purpose as the most
impeccable of orders."39 Thus, it is claimed, that in this sense every unlawful
administrative act, however invalid, is merely voidable.

3

CHRISTOPHER FORsymH & H.W.L WADE, ADMINISTRATIVE L&w 41 (1994) [hereinafter WADE &
Fonsr].
Christopher Forsyth, The Metaphysic ofNullity, in THE GOEN MErWAND AND THE CROOKED
CoRm: EssAYs a HONOUR OF SIR WILLIAM WADE QC 142, 144 (Christopher Forsyth & Ivan
Hare eds., 1998) [hereinafter Forsyth].

[r1975,] A.C. 295.

Id. at 366.
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[T]he truth of the matter is that the court will invalidate an order
only if the right remedy is sought by the right person in the right
proceedings and circumstances...[Otherwise], the 'void' order

remains effective and is, in reality, valid. It follows that an order may
be void for one purpose and valid for another... 'Void' is therefore
meaningless in any absolute sense. Its meaning is relative depending
upon the court's willingness to grant relief in any particular situation.40
Simply put, the crucial idea is that "unlawful acts, which are undeniably
non-existent in law, do exist in fact. That factual existence may be perceived as
legal existence; and individuals may understandably take decisions on that
basis."4' The obvious implication for our purposes is that a post-Constitutional
law in contravention of fundamental rights must therefore be seen not as void ab
initio or a nullity, but merely voidable, and hence, capable of being revived under
the Doctrine.
However, even if one accepts that a piece of legislation can be treated as
void only after an affirmative declaration to that effect by a court of law, the
author submits that once a court has declared that an act is legally a nullity, the
Doctrine of Ultra Vires necessarily implies that the resultant situation is "as if
nothing had happened."42 Thus, to hold that the mere fact of the existence of a
particular unconstitutional law on the statute books, prior to its being challenged
and struck down, gives it a de jure status that can subsequently be revivified by
the Doctrine of Eclipse, would, in the author's judgment, render the core of the
Doctrine of Ultra Vires which is the all important distinction between the lawful
and the unlawful - superfluous and nugatory. Such an interpretation is best
dismissed outright.
However, it must be noted in this connection, that Indian courts have in
the past tried to draw a distinction between laws void due to lack of necessary
competence on the part of the Legislature, and those void due to constitutional
prohibitions. According to Venkatarama Ayyar, J. in Behram, the legal effect of
the declaration of unconstitutionality (and by implication, the applicability of
the Doctrine), differs depending upon whether the constitutional prohibition that
has been infringed affects the competence of the Legislature to enact the law, or
whether it merely operates as a check on the exercise of a power which is within

40
4

42

WADE AND FoRsTH, supra note 36, at 341-344 as cited in Forsyth, supra note 37, at 144.
Forsyth, id.
WADE & FoRsym, supra note 316, at 43.
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its competence.43 It is only if the unconstitutionality is due to legislative
incompetence, that such a law will be an absolute nullity. A distinction was also
drawn between a Constitutional prohibition enacted for the benefit of the public
generally, and that for individual benefit, the former being a nullity, the latter
merely unenforceable. 4 However, Mahajan, C.J., speaking for the majority in
Behram, had rejected this distinction outright. He was of the opinion that both
declarations of unconstitutionality go to the root of the legislative power, and
that there is no distinction between them. The rationale for this was that the
legislative power of the Parliament and State Legislatures, conferred by Articles
245 and 246, are curtailed by Part III of the Constitution, dealing with fundamental
rights, as has been clearly stated in Article 13(2). This sufficiently indicates that
there is no competency in the Parliament or State Legislatures to make a law
which comes into clash with Part III.45
Nevertheless, Venkatarama Ayyar's, J. distinction was reiterated in M.P.V.
Sundararamier& Co. v. Andhra Pradesh46 and has been concurred with by the
Bombay High Court. in C.R.H. Readymoney Ltd. v. Bombay.47 After
Sundararamier, however, the Supreme Court has disregarded this distinction. In
Basheshar Nath v. Commissioner, LT.,45 Subba Rao, J. negated it, and reiterated

this view in Deep Chand v. State of U.P." He followed the same reasoning as was
given by Mahajan, C.J. in Behrom.
4

Behram, A.LR. 1955 S.C. 123, 156.

44

45

An example of a constitutional prohibition enacted for the benefit of the general
public is Article 301, in Part XIII of the Constitution, prohibiting restrictions on
interstate trade and commerce, a law in violation of which would be a nullity. See
Behram, id.
Behram, id. at 145-146.

46

A.LR. 1958 S.C. 468, 489. What is interesting to note here is that for substantiating

47

4

4

the argument that a law contravening the rights conferred upon the individual for
his benefit is merely unenforceable and not a nullity, American authorities such as
Pierce v. Somerset Railway, 171 U.S. 641, were used. However, that case dealt with
a different issue, and the question of whether a subsequent change in the Constitution
could revive the impugned law, did not arise.
A.I.R. 1958 Bom. 181, at 187. It is pertinent to mention two American cases, which
are believed to have laid the foundation for this distinction. In Newberry v. United
States, (1921) 256 U.S. 232, it was held that if a statute is beyond the Legislature's
legislative power, it is not valid without re-enactment (if subsequently, by
constitutional amendment, the necessary legislative power is granted); whereas
Wilkerson v. Rahrer, (1891) 140 U.S. 545, established that if an act within the general
legislative power of the enacting body is rendered unconstitutional by reason of
some adventitious circumstance, then it does not need to be re-enacted in order to be
enforced, if this cause of its unconstitutionality is removed.
A.IR. 1959 S.C. 149.
A.LR. 1959 S.C. 648, 66o.
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Amongst the eminent constitutional law jurists, Seervai initially seems to
be unambiguously in favour of the distinction, and severely criticizes the decisions
in Basheshar and Deep Chand.50 However, it must be noted here that Seervai later
makes a complete volte-face on this point while commenting on the case of Minoo
Framroze Balsarav. Union of Indian He not only appears to be against the very
concept of eclipse, but also tries to play down the difference in unconstitutionality
arising due to lack of legislative powers and constitutional prohibitions?
Thus, even Seervai has acknowledged that presently, the law does not
countenance any such distinction, and hence, it may be unequivocally stated
that the Doctrine, as presently envisaged, does not extend to the revival of postConstitutional laws that have been struck down for infringing fundamental rights.
In this context, however, a reference may be made to the provisions of
Article 31B, read with the Ninth Schedule of the Constitution.53 In A.K.
Krishnaswamyv. State of Madras,54the Madras Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling
on Land) Act, 1961 was struck down as unconstitutional for violating Articles 14,
19, and 31(2). Subsequent to the decision, the Act was added to the Ninth Schedule

by the Constitution (Seventeenth Amendment) Act, 1964. The Act was again
challenged in L. Jagannath v. Authorised Officer.56 It was contended by the

appellant that the Act, having been struck down as invalid by the Supreme Court
in Krishnaswamy, was non-est and void ab initio, and that Article 31B could not

validate it without the enactment of a separate validating Act. The Court held that
such an Act, even though inoperative when enacted because of its inconsistency
with a fundamental right, assumes full force and vigour retrospectively, as soon

as it is included in the Ninth Schedule, and hence, it is not necessary to re-enact it.
Thus, the author submits that the same result will be achieved as regards
the post-Constitutional laws by invoking Article 31B, read with the Ninth Schedule,
as is achieved by the application of the Doctrine of Eclipse to pre-Constitutional

laws. 6
SoAccording to him, both these decisions of Subba Rao, J. were per incuriam because he
had not referred to Sundararamier,which had clearly laid down this difference. See
SEERvAY, supra note 16, at 251.
5 A.I.R. 1992 Born. 375.
5 See 2 SEERVM, supra note 16, at app. c.
5 Article 31B, entitled "Validation of Acts and Regulations" may be invoked for curing
the defects in a law enacted by the Legislature. This Article provides that any Act
added to the Ninth Sche4dule shall not be deemed to be void or ever to have become
void on the ground of its inconsistency with any of the fundamental rights,
notwithstanding any decision of any court or tribunal.
A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 1515.
-65A.I.R. 1972 S.C. 145.
-56

See also, NARENDER KiR,
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APPLICABILITY OF THE DOCTRINE TO CENTRESTATE DISPUTES

Drawing upon the above analysis, the question of the operation of the
Doctrine in the federal framework may now be considered. The Constitution of
India envisages a singular mechanism for effecting adjustments in the framework
of the distribution of powers, to introduce an element of flexibility in an otherwise
inherently rigid federal structure. Some of these measures include the inclusion
of a sizeable Concurrent List to break down to some extent, the impassable barriers
between the exclusive Centre-State domains. A number of provisions (namely,
Articles 249, 250, 252 and 253) that enable Parliament to validly legislate in the
State sphere, are also in place.
It follows from the above that at times, repugnancy or inconsistency may
arise between a validly enacted Central and State Act, thus resulting in a conflict.
Repugnancy has been the subject of contemplation in many apex court judgments,
and it may broadly be said to arise when the provisions of the two laws are fully
inconsistent and are absolutely irreconcilable, such that it is impossible to obey
one, without disobeying the other.5'
The framers of the Constitution, possibly mindful of such an eventuality,
have provided certain inherent safeguards to resolve such inconsistencies and
conflicts. The Constitution provides for resolution of inconsistency between a
Union and a State law under two Articles, namely 25158 and 254,59 both of which

57
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I.T.C. Ltd. v. Agricultural Produce Market Committee, A.I.R. 2002 S.C. 852.
CONsTImUTION OF INDIA, 1950, Article 251 reads;
251. Inconsistency between laws made by Parliament under Articles 249
and 250 and laws made by the Legislatures of States. - Nothing in Articles
249 and 250 shall restrict the power of the Legislature of a State to make
any law which under this Constitution it has power to make, but if any
provision of a law made by the Legislature of a State is repugnant to any
provision of a law made by Parliament which Parliament has under either
of the said articles power to make, the law made by Parliament, whether
passed before or after the law made by the Legislature of the State, shall
prevail, and the law made by the Legislature of the State shall to the

extent of the repugnancy, but so long only as the law made by Parliament
59

continues to have effect, be inoperative.
INDIA, 1950, Article 254 reads:
254. Inconsistency between laws made by Parliament and laws made by
the Legislatures of States. - (i) If any provision of a law made by the
Legislature of a State is repugnant to any provision of a law made by
Parliament which Parliament is competent to enact, or to any provision
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Doctrine of Eclipse
indisputably establish that the Central law shall prevail over the repugnant State
law.
However, the wording of these Articles has fuelled a raging controversy
regarding the consequence of such repugnancy for the State law. Article 251 uses
the expression "inoperative" and further qualifies it by stating "so long only as
the law made by Parliament continues to have effect." On the other hand, Article
254, uses the expression -void" in place of "inoperative" and does not contain
any qualification like that contained in Article 251. Primafacie, this gives the
impression that the effect of repugnancy in Article 251 is merely to render the
repugnant State law inoperative, whereas under Article 254 the consequences
are much more severe.6 o Indeed, in M. Karunanidhiv. Union of India,6' it was
forcefully contended that repugnancy under Article 254 had the effect of impliedly
repealing the subordinate law.
The pertinent questions to be considered, then, are: What is the effect of
repugnancy? Does repugnancy result in the subordinate law (i.e., the State law,
unless it has fulfilled the requirements of obtaining Presidential assent under
Article 254(2)), becoming a total nullity, or does it make the subordinate law
merely inoperative, such that it can again become operative once the repugnancy
has been removed? Does it have the same outcome in the differing situations
envisaged in Articles 251 and 254? Simply put, what is the scope for the

applicability of the Doctrine of Eclipse, as enunciated earlier, in resolving such
inconsistency between Union and State laws?

of an existing law with respect to one of the matters enumerated in the
Concurrent List, then, subject to the provisions of clause (2), the law
made by Parliament, whether passed before or after the law made by
Legislature of such State, or, as the case may be, the existing law, shall
prevail and the law made by the Legislature of the State shall, to the
extent of the repugnancy, be void.
(2) Where a law made by the Legislature of a State with respect to one of
the matters enumerated in the Concurrent List contains any provision
repugnant to the provisions of an earlier law made by Parliament or an
existing law with respect to that matter, then, the law so made by the
Legislature of such State shall, if it has been reserved for the consideration
of the President and has received his assent, prevail in that State:
Provided that nothing in this clause shall prevent Parliament from
enacting at any time any law with respect to the same matter including
a law adding to, amending, varying or repealing the law so made by the
Legislature of State.
SANIRUDH PRASAD, CENTRE-STATE RELATIONS 201 (1989).

61A.I.R.

1979 S.C. 898.
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Let us begin by dealing with the scope and effect of Article 251. According

to Article 249, which allows Parliament to legislate on matters covered in the
State List pursuant to a resolution passed by the Rajya Subha, the law made by
Parliament would cease to have effect six months after the resolution of the Rajya
Sabha comes to an end (the resolution remains in force for one year, and may be
renewed for a period not exceeding a year at a time). Similarly, no law of Parliament
made under Article 250, which empowers the Parliament to legislate on matters
covered in the State List during an Emergency, shall remain in force after six
months from the expiry of the Proclamation of such Emergency. Hence, these
provisions are necessarily of strictly temporary efficacy.6 2
Though Parliament is thus empowered to legislate on matters in the State
List, the State Legislature continues to have power to make laws, which it is
empowered to make under the Constitution. 63 This is, however, subject to the rule
of repugnancy laid down in Article 251, whereby the repugnant State law very
clearly does not become void or ultra vires. It is merely inoperative and that too
only to the extent of the repugnancy. When the Union law is repealed the State law
will be revived. 64
The Supreme Court in Mahendra Jaini, has cited Article 251 as an example
of the Constitution-makers using specific words like "inoperative" to express their
intention of restricting the application of an Article to a particular time period.
Hence, legislation by Parliament on a State subject under Articles 249 and 250
will be temporary legislationt" and laws passed by Parliament will not be kept on
the statute book permanently. In other words, the repugnant State law has only
been "eclipsed" by the temporary dominant Parliament law, and on its repeal, it
automatically becomes operative once more, and need not be re-enacted.
However, there is disagreement over the fate of a State law that is repugnant
under Article 254(1). While the decision in M. Karunanidhi is to the effect that no
law found to be repugnant under Article 254 can be revived by a subsequent
amendment or repeal of the dominant law,66 the more common view is that such
subordinate laws only remain in abeyance until the dominant law is repealed/

" PuAjPT, supra note 21, at 274.
63

SHUKLA, supra note 5, at 674.

64 T.K. ToPE, CONSTITuTIONAL LAw OF INDIA 529 (1982).
6 JAIN, supra note 3, at 63o.
66

See M. Karunanidhi,A.IR. 1979 S.C. 898
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amended.67 It is worthwhile to examine the latter contention in view of the
preponderance of jurists' opinions in its favour.
At the outset it must be said that it would not be proper to draw any firm
conclusions merely on the basis of the use of different expressions in Articles 251
and 254. As seen in detail previously, the term "void" - at least as interpreted by
Indian courts - does not necessarily translate into "total nullity", and must be
construed in reference to the context in which it has been used by the Constitution
makers.68
Coming to Article 254(1), both the Parliament and the State Legislatures
have the power to pass a law on any matter in the Concurrent list. Therefore, laws
that come within the purview of Article 254(1) are not such as to be invalid for
lack of legislative competence. But when two laws, equally valid, conflict with
each other, one is subordinated to the other and is rendered void. This, however,
only means that such law has become inoperative and is kept in abeyance so long
as the conflict lasts .6 The conflict can be removed by an amendment of either
law, or by the disappearance from the scene of the dominant law. In such a case,
there is no reason why the law, once void, should not revive and become
operative?0 This much can be said on the basis of principle. It is also borne out by
case law?'
In the U.S.A. as well, it has been well settled that while an unconstitutional
legislation is not a law, and in legal contemplation as though never enacted, yet
this dictum does not apply to State statutes becoming inoperative because of
their repugnance to federal statutes in the concurrent field. As early as 1819, in

67

Several stalwarts figure in this list. See D.D. BAsu, COMMENTARY

ON THE CONSTrUTION

OF INDIA

(1965); JAIN, supra note 3; ToPE, supra note 64.
68 See § II (A) above.
69 BAsu, supra rote 67, at 205.
70

id.

71

In Srikant Lal v. State of Bihar, A.I.R. 1958 Pat 496, the Patna High Court expressed

the view that a repugnant State law under Article 254 shall "remain in abeyance"
until the Central law is repealed by Parliament, and as soon as the Central law
disappears from the scene the State law will revive. Ramaswami, C.J. observed:
The true position is that the Provincial law was eclipsed or overshadowed
by the Dominion legislation and as soon as the Dominion legislation ceased
to operate, the shadow was removed and the Provincial law was vitalised
and revived and made free from all blemish or infirmity.
Id. at 5oo.
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Sturges v. Crowninshield,72 the question was whether the power of the State to
make laws in respect of bankruptcy came to an end in the event of a federal
enactment on the same subject even when the federal enactment was subsequently
repealed. It was held that the State's power to make such a law in respect of
bankruptcy was only suspended and not extinguished by the enactment of a federal
law and consequently, when the federal law was repealed the repeal resulted in
the removal of the disability to the exercise of such a power by the State. Thus
Sturges can be taken to have laid down the principle that in the concurrent field,
the exercise of the federal power merely renders the state legislatures' power
inoperative.
In Tua v. Carriere,7 the dictum of Sturges was followed though no reference
was made to it. On similar facts, the Court held that the operation of State laws
relating to bankruptcy was merely suspended till the repeal of the federal law,
which repeal revivified them. The Court held that the fact that the State law was
enacted during the operation of the federal law did not invalidate it. It simply
meant that the State law would take effect only on the repeal of the federal law.
Thus it can be stated that in the concurrent sphere where both federal and the
state legislatures have power to legislate, unconstitutionality of a State statute for
incompatibility with a federal statute does not have the effect of wiping the State
statute off the statute book; it merely results in suspending its operation. However,
the author submits that the above approach is flawed by reason of its dogmatic
stance that the State law can always be revived by virtue of the Doctrine of Eclipse,
irrespective of whether it was passed prior to or following the passage of the
relevant Central Act.
Notably, on the question of whether "void"' in Article 254 (1) means void ab
initio, that is, still-born, or simply invalid, the Supreme Court has, drawn a
distinction between the law of a State made prior to an existing law or a law of
Parliament, and laws made subsequently. While in the former case, the law of the
State shall become invalid from the date on which the existing law or the
Parliamentary law came into force and will be valid for past transactions, in the
latter, the law will be void ab initio, and cannot be revived. Thus, drawing an
analogy from Article 13(1) the Supreme Court, in Deep Chand, held that the State
Act was valid for the purpose of all transactions before the commencement of the
Union Act. It observed:

72

73

Sturges v. Crowninshield, 4 Wheat 122 (181g), cited from Zubair Ahmed Khan, The
Doctrine of Ecipse, 7 (1) CocmN Umv. L. REv. 16 (1983).
Ta v. Carriere, 117 U.S. 201, cited from Zubair Ahmed Khan, The Doctrine of Eclipse,
7 (1) CocHIN UN. L, REv. 16 (1983).
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Article 13(i), so far as it is relevant here, is in part materia with
Article 254(1). While under Article 13(1), all pre-constitution laws,

to the extent of their inconsistency with the provisions of Part III are
void; under Article 254(1) the State law to the extent of repugnancy
to the law made by Parliament is void. If the pre-constitution law
exists for the post-constitution periods for all past transactions, by
the same parity of reasoning, the State law subsists after the making
of the Union law, for past transactions.74
Though there is no direct ruling on this point, if this analogy is carried
further, then the State law made prior to the Parliament law should automatically
revive after the repugnancy has been removed by an amendment or repeal of the
Union law. The State law is simply eclipsed by an inconsistent law made by
Parliament and as soon as the inconsistency is removed, the State law should
again become operative. This is so in the case of the (analogous) inconsistency
arising under Article 13(1).7

The author submits that this approach is sound in view of the fact that the
State Legislature had the competence to make the law at time that it did, and
subsequent repugnancy with a law of Parliament cannot have the effect of denying
it this initial competence.
However, where the State Legislature lacks the initial competence to pass
the law, there can be no question of its revival by the doctrine of eclipse. In the
Australian case of Carterv. Egg and Egg Pulp Marketing Board,6 section log of

the Australian Constitution, which provides that "when a law of a State is
inconsistent with a law of the Commonwealth, the latter shall prevail, and the
former shall, to the extent of the inconsistency, be invalid"," was under
consideration. Commenting on that section, Latham, C.J. observed, that this
section applied only where both laws were valid at inception, and if "either is
invalid ab initic by reason of lack of power, no question can arise under the
Section."" Hence, if the State Legislature did not have the initial competence to
pass the law in the face of an inconsistent Commonwealth law, it would be stillborn
and incapable of revival by the Doctrine.

74

Deep Chand v. State of U.P., supra note 28, at 68o,

'

D.J.

DE, THE CONSTITTION OF INDIA 167 (2002).

(1942) 66 C.L.R. 557, 573. See also, Ex parte Daniell, (1920) 28 C.L.R. 23, 33.
77 CONSTUImON or AUSTRALiA, § 109, available at http://www.aphgov.au/ senate/general/
constitution/ (last visited March 18, 20o6).
76

78

Carter,supra note 76.
65

Vol. 18(1)

Student Bar Review

2oo6

Further, it is submitted that if the State law is made while an inconsistent
existing law or law of Parliament is already in force, it would be null and void ab
initio as still-born because the State Legislature in that case lacks the initial
competence to make that law. This is because there is no distinction, as discussed
earlier, between an absence of competence, and a restriction on its exercise'
Hence, there is no question of such a law coming into operation by a subsequent
repeal of the law made by Parliament.

B. The Position Regarding Article 254(2)
Article 254(2) provides that a subsequent State law repugnant to an existing
law or an earlier Union law, shall, if it receives the President's assent, prevail in
that State. This clearly implies that the Central law shall remain operative in other
States, and is, therefore, eclipsed only in that State, and should become operative
and effective again as soon as the repugnancy is removed by an amendment or
repeal of the State law by the State Legislature.
This proposition has been doubted by the Supreme Court in, what may be
considered an obiter, in M. Karunanidhi v. Union of India.a The question was
whether subsequent repeal of a State law, inconsistent with a prior Parliament
law, which had obtained the assent of the President under Article 254(2), revives
the law of Parliament in that State. The Court said.
It is true that the doctrine of eclipse would not apply to the
constitutionality of the Central law and the only question we have to
determine is whether there was such an irreconcilable inconsistency
between the State and Central Acts that the provisions of the Central
Acts stood repealed and unless re-enacted the said provisions cannot
be invoked even after the State Act was itself repealed.8' [emphasis
added.]
The author submits that this is not the correct view of the law, because a
law, valid when enacted, should automatically revive when the shadow of the
supervening law has been removed, by virtue of the Doctrine. This is also necessary
to avoid a vacuum that might be created in a State after a State law has been
repealed in that State, without a fresh legislation being passed. It would also be

7

See § II (B) above.,

"o AIR. 1979 S.C. 898.
81 Id. at 903.
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highly incongruous if an Act applicable in other States required re-enactment for
the purposes of one State.

V. CONCLUSION
The Doctrine of Eclipse exemplifies a subtle, nuanced aspect of the theory
of Constitutionalism and the rule of law; and the fundamental distinction that it
postulates between lawfulness and unlawfulness. It is used, in exceptional
circumstances, to save unconstitutional statutes from being totally wiped off the
statute book, and to merely render them dormant or inoperative for the time
being. While ordinarily, a statute held unconstitutional cannot be revived except
by re-enactment, a statute under eclipse is revived by obliteration of the
limitations generating the taint of unconstitutionality.
The question of whether the Doctrine can be extended to revive postConstitutional laws as well, has engendered acrimonious debate among jurists82
and judges1 alike, and has also thrown up intriguing constitutional questions that
beg for decisive judicial determination, such as the exact connotation of the word
"void" in Article 13(1) and (2), and whether the American notion of "relatively
void" is applicable to the Indian scenario. The fact of the matter is that there has
been no unambiguous pronouncement by the Supreme Court on this issue
following Ambica Mills, and thus far, the Doctrine of Eclipse has not been applied
to post-Constitutional laws, a position with which the author is, as afore mentioned
in this paper, inclined to agree.
It must be mentioned here that the Doctrine has been put to an entirely new
use in our country, as compared to other Commonwealth jurisdictions. It has
been extended far beyond the sphere of distribution of legislative power between
the Centre and the States, and has been used as an instrument for harmonizing the
pre-Constitutional legal order with the main dictates of the Constitution. It has
[SEERVAI, supra note i6], V.N. Shukla [Siua±A, supra note 5] and T.IC. Tope
[ToPs, supra note 64] appear to be in favour of the revival of post-Constitutional laws

* Seervai

83

by virtue of the Doctrine, whereas D.J. De [DE, supra note 75], M.P, Jain [JAm, supra
note 3], H.K. Saharay [SAHARAY, supra note 1] and D.D. Basu [BAsu, supra note 67]
have persuasively argued against it, citing the impossibility of reviving an Act
which never had any valid existence.
See, on the one hand, the decision of Matthew, J., in Shree Ambica Mills, AIR 1974
S.C. 1300, which has been used to argue in favour of the revival of post-Constitutional
laws, and on the other hand, the decision in Mahendra Lal Jaini,A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 109,
which denies such a possibility. See also the majority judgment against the revival
of post-Constitutional laws, in P.L. Mehra v. DR. Khanna, A.IR. 1970 Del. 1, and the
dissenting opinion of V.N. Deshpande, J.
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become an important tool of judicial interpretation, and has been applied to fields
other than those contemplated by Article 13 as well - for example, in making a
decree lying dormant executable,14 or determining the caste of a person who
reconverts to Hinduism from another religion,5 or even to cases of rules, that is,
subordinate legislation.m However, this is certainly at the expense of virtually
ignoring its most significant application in contemporary times, that is, in the
realm of pre-empting Centre-State disputes under Articles 251. and 254. Common
sense also yields the inevitable result that after more than 50 years of the adoption
of the Constitution, a Doctrine focusing on the fate of pre-Constitutional laws in
contravention of the fundamental rights, will ultimately be consigned to the
depths of obscurity. Furthermore, the true scope and implications of its application
in the area of federal relations has not been fully comprehended as yet. It is the
author's submission that, akin to the judiciary's interpretation regarding the use
of the Doctrine to revive post-Constitutional laws, it should be conclusively laid
down that in case the concerned State Legislature did not possess the initial
competence to pass a law due to the prior existence of a repugnant Central law,
the impugned law is to be treated as stillborn and incapable of revival.
We have seen that the Doctrine underlines the crucial distinction between
"lawfulness" and "unlawfulness" in the sphere of constitutional law. However, it
should also be noted that part of the rationale behind its invocation appears to
have been to avoid the administrative hassles and the wastage of time and
resources necessarily incurred in re-enacting a law or issuing a law afresh, by
simply allowing an existing law, rendered unenforceable due to its contravention
of fundamental rights, to revive automatically. However, it is pertinent to mention
at this juncture that concerns might validly arise about whether the Doctrine
should continue to be applied or not. This is simply because the Doctrine
automatically revives laws. So, for example, were the Union to amend the
Constitution with a particular goal, it would revive all the prior laws that were in
conflict with the unamended Constitution, and these laws would be revived without
having to pass through the debate and scrutiny which any law being re-enacted
ordinarily has to undergo.
However, the author is of the view that despite such apprehensions, the
potential benefits of the Doctrine, including economizing on the Legislature's time
and expenditure, and, more importantly, resolving Centre-State disputes that
are almost sure to arise under Articles 251 and 254, outweigh the "costs" associated
with it. It follows, therefore, that the Doctrine has not outlived its utility.
4 Dularey Lodh v. III Additional District Judge, Kanpur, A.I.R. 1984 S.C. 1260.
8 Kailash Sonkar v. Smt.Maya Devi, A.I.R. 1984 S.C. 411.
* Muhammadbhai v. State of Gujarat, A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 1517.
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